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Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a federally funded initiative that 
brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement to reduce gun 
violence in urban centers. In Chicago, PSN implemented supply-side gun 
policing tactics, enhanced federal prosecution of gun crimes, and 
notification forums warning offenders of PSN’s heightened criminal 
sanctions. Prior evaluations provide evidence that PSN initiatives have 
reduced crime in the first few years of their operation. But over a decade 
after the program was established, we still know little about whether these 
effects are sustained over an extended period of time. This Article examines 
PSN Chicago, an anti-violence program in operation since 2002. 
Consistent with a previous evaluation, we find that several program 
components were associated with reductions in violence in the initial target 
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areas. These associations, however, are concentrated in the first few years 
of the intervention. We also examine the effect of PSN in several subsequent 
expansion areas and find no detectable effects. We suggest that the effects 
of PSN were diluted as the program expanded to larger areas of the city 
without an increase in funding or resources. Still, we recommend that 
future research consider PSN’s strategies in Chicago that appeared 
effective in the early years and leverage those insights for future programs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a federally funded initiative that 
brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement with researchers 
and community organizations to devise context-specific strategies for 
reducing gun violence. Since 2001, Congress has allocated over a billion 
dollars to the U.S. Attorney’s Office to oversee PSN programs in the 94 
federal districts. 1  Each jurisdiction crafted a set of interventions that 
typically included increased federal prosecution of gun crimes.2 
Prior case studies3 and systematic empirical investigations4 of PSN 
have generally been positive. Most recently, a national evaluation examined 
 
1 See EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS—A NATIONAL 
PROGRAM TO REDUCE GUN CRIME: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 1 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL 
PROJECT REPORT]. 
2 Id. at iii. 
3  See generally EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS: 
STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA: CASE STUDY 5, at 2 (2007), 
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/MD_Alabama.pdf (finding a decrease in some crime 
categories, including homicide and gun assault, after the program began); JACK MCDEVITT 
ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS: STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS, LOWELL, DISTRICT OF 
MASSACHUSETTS: CASE STUDY 6, at 2 (2007), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Lowell_
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the association between PSN dosage and crime in 82 PSN sites and 170 
control sites and found that high-dosage PSN sites experienced declines in 
violent crime relative to control sites, while low-dosage sites experienced 
no change.5 
The current study examines the long-term effects of PSN in Chicago, 
where the program has operated for over a decade. Given the size of the 
city’s population and its high rate of gun violence, the PSN taskforce 
initially focused on two of the highest crime police districts. The taskforce 
devised three primary strategies. First, it established a case review process 
to make strategic decisions about the prosecution of all gun-related cases. 
Suitable cases are diverted to federal court where more severe penalties are 
often available.6 Second, the taskforce created a multi-agency “gun team” to 
investigate gun trafficking cases and trace all recovered firearms.7 Third, 
drawing on the experiences of other focused-deterrence initiatives in cities 
like Boston and Richmond,8 the PSN team in Chicago developed offender 
notification forums in which law enforcement officers and social service 
providers meet with parolees and probationers convicted of gun-related 
crimes. Forum attendees are cautioned about the consequences of 
 
MA.pdf (observing a reduction in some crime categories, including aggravated assaults with 
a firearm, after the program began); see also NATALIE KROOVAND HIPPLE ET AL., PROJECT 
SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS CASE STUDY REPORT: DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA (CASE STUDY 9) 23 
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241727.pdf (observing a reduction in 
firearm offenses after the program began). 
4 See generally Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Project Safe Neighborhoods and Violent 
Crime Trends in US Cities: Assessing Violent Crime Impact, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 165 (2010) [hereinafter Assessing Violent Crime Impact]; FINAL PROJECT 
REPORT, supra note 1; Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, 
Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 223 (2007) (evaluating the effect of PSN Chicago in the first several years of its 
operation). But see J.C. Barnes et al., A Partial Assessment of South Carolina’s Project Safe 
Neighborhoods Strategy: Evidence from a Sample of Supervised Offenders, 38 J. CRIM. 
JUSTICE 383 (2010) (observing an increase in firearm-related crimes after South Carolina’s 
PSN program began). 
5 Assessing Violent Crime Impact, supra note 4, at 173, 176–77. 
6 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 233. 
7 Id. at 232–33. 
8 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth 
Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195 
(2001) [hereinafter Problem-Oriented Policing] (examining Boston’s Operation Ceasefire 
over a two-year period); Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: 
The Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 
251 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (reassessing the impact of Project Exile on 
homicide and other crimes). 
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committing further gun crimes and are offered social, educational, health, 
and employment services.9 
An initial evaluation examined the effects of PSN Chicago from 2002 
to 2004. 10  The investigation found evidence that several of these PSN 
initiatives reduced violent crime in the two target districts. Modest 
reductions in violence were associated with the number of PSN 
prosecutions and gun seizures, while larger reductions were associated with 
the percentage of eligible offenders who attended an offender notification 
forum.11 
PSN Chicago did not stop in 2004. On the contrary, the program 
continues to this day in the original target districts. And, after the initial 
evaluation, PSN swiftly expanded to other areas of the city, often with no 
increase in programmatic resources. By 2007, both the case-review process 
and the multi-agency gun-teams had expanded citywide. And by 2009, the 
offender notification forums were distributed across 24% of the police 
districts in the city. 
The present study seeks to answer two questions. First, do the original 
PSN districts continue to experience programmatic effects years later? 
Much has happened in Chicago since 2002, including an unprecedented 
decline in the city’s homicide rate to a nearly 48-year low.12 Second, have 
PSN expansion districts experienced programmatic effects that are 
comparable to those in the original districts? To answer these questions, the 
present study builds upon the initial evaluation by examining data that 
spans roughly eight years of the program and a larger geographic area. 
Evaluations of anti-violence programs like PSN face a series of well-
known methodological challenges. 13  Most importantly, the initial target 
areas for PSN were not selected randomly. They were selected precisely 
because they had the highest rate of homicide and gun violence in the city.14 
Two challenges result. First, non-random selection creates the potential for 
 
9 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 231–32. 
10 Id. at 245, 255. 
11 Id. at 260. 
12 Andrew V. Papachristos, 48 Years of Crime in Chicago: A Descriptive Analysis of 
Serious Crime Trends from 1965 to 2013, at 5 (Inst. for Soc. & Policy Studies, Working 
Paper No. 13-023, 2013), http://isps.yale.edu/sites/default/publication/2013/12/48yearsof
 crime_final_ispsworkingpaper023.pdf. 
13 See, e.g., Richard A. Berk, Knowing When to Fold ‘Em: An Essay on Evaluating the 
Impact of Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 451 (2005) 
(identifying many of the methodological limitations in the design of observational studies of 
anti-violence programs). 
14 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 242. 
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bias because we cannot apply an experimental design to evaluate the effects 
of the program. Second, PSN’s decision to target the highest crime areas of 
the city creates the potential for statistical imprecision because there are few 
remaining neighborhoods for our comparison group. This problem is 
exacerbated by PSN’s expansion throughout the city. The comparison 
groups from the earlier evaluation of PSN Chicago, for example, quickly 
became the second set of target areas when the program expanded. 
The current study represents our best effort to overcome these 
challenges given the data and methodological tools available. We use 
propensity score matching to select a set of comparison areas for the 
original and expansion PSN districts based on neighborhood-level measures 
that are theoretically linked with violence. We apply growth curve and fixed 
effect models to estimate the effects on homicide of the dosage of three 
main program components: PSN prosecutions, gun seizures, and offender 
notification forums. 
Our results are as follows. First, in the original PSN areas we find a 
modest negative correlation between homicide and the dosage of federal 
prosecutions and offender notification forums. These results are sensitive to 
some alternative model specifications, which we discuss in greater detail 
below. For instance, when we exclude the first three years of PSN from the 
analysis, the negative correlation between forum dosage and homicide 
decreases dramatically and is no longer statistically significant. This 
suggests that PSN may have reduced homicide in its early years, but as with 
other similar anti-violence programs, the effects may have dissipated over 
time. 15  Second, we find little evidence of programmatic effects in the 
expansion areas. Both of these findings may, to some extent, reflect greater 
levels of error in our measures of PSN dosage due to changes in data 
collection over time. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part I describes 
PSN Chicago, the initial neighborhoods targeted by the program, and the 
evaluation by Papachristos et al. It then reviews some of the challenges 
faced by the PSN team in sustaining the program over its long life. Part II 
describes the design of the current study, and Part III details our results. 
Part IV explores the implications of our work for PSN, other anti-violence 
programs, and future research. 
 
15 See Robin S. Engel et al., Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused Deterrence: 
Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), 30 JUST. Q. 403, 431–32 
(2013) (discussing the failure of some anti-violence programs to sustain effects over longer 
periods of time). 
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I. PSN IN CHICAGO 
A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
As described elsewhere, PSN Chicago is not a single program but a 
bundle of interrelated interventions aimed at reducing gun violence in high-
crime communities. Since May 2002, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Northern District of Illinois has overseen a PSN taskforce of representatives 
from the Chicago Police Department, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s 
Office, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Cook County 
Department of Probation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives, the City of Chicago, a group of research partners, and more 
than twelve community-based organizations. The taskforce meets monthly 
to coordinate PSN operations.16 
PSN Chicago consists of three core strategies. First, the taskforce 
increased federal prosecutions of gun crimes.17 Prosecuting gun offenders in 
federal rather than state court was thought to increase deterrence because 
federal prison sentences tend to be longer, federal inmates serve a minimum 
of 85% of their sentence, and federal prosecutions have a higher overall 
conviction rate.18 To increase the number of federal prosecutions, the PSN 
taskforce designed a case review process in which federal and local 
prosecutors review all gun cases in Chicago to determine whether to 
prosecute in state or federal court.19 
Second, the taskforce established a PSN “gun team.” The Chicago 
Police Department recovered between 10,000 and 16,000 guns per year 
between 1995 and 2002. 20  Yet at the time PSN was established, the 
department’s gun-related policing efforts were primarily reactive, occurring 
after the commission of a gun crime or else as a supplement to criminal 
investigations of other types of offenses. PSN created a multi-agency “gun 
team” to investigate supply-side crimes like gun use, sales, and trafficking. 
The gun team also conducted seizures and served warrants on pending cases 
involving guns.21 
 
16 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 229–33. 
17 Id. at 233. 
18 Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 643, 674–75 (1997). 
19 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 233. 
20 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2002), https://portal.chicagopolice.
org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Annual%20Reports/02Annual
Report.pdf. 
21 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 233. 
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Third, the PSN taskforce developed offender notification forums 
(forums), one of the program’s most distinctive features. A forum is a 
round-table meeting with twelve to twenty offenders who have a history of 
gun violence and gang participation, and who were recently assigned to 
parole or probation. These hour-long meetings are held in a non-law 
enforcement location of civic importance such as a local park building, 
community organization, or school.22 The first segment of the meeting lasts 
approximately fifteen minutes and stresses deterrence. A panel of local and 
federal law enforcement emphasizes the consequences of future gun 
offenses, including the likelihood of federal prosecution. In the second 
fifteen-minute segment, an ex-offender involved in local crime prevention 
programs discusses the seriousness of gun violence in the community and 
the real-life struggles that ex-offenders face when re-entering society. The 
final segment stresses the choices offenders can make to avoid gun crime. 
This thirty-minute segment is presented by service providers, education 
specialists, health professionals, and employment counselors, all of whom 
offer services and outreach.23 
The forums are based on two interrelated principles. First, deterrence 
messages should directly target gun offenders.24 Since the vast majority of 
the population—including the offending population—does not engage in 
gun-related crimes, broad sweeping deterrence strategies are an inefficient 
use of limited resources.25 Second, positive interactions with police officers 
and prosecutors can increase offenders’ perception of the legitimacy of law 
enforcement and may encourage greater compliance with the law.26 
 PSN originally targeted the 11th and 15th police districts in Chicago,27 
which had experienced some of the highest per capita homicide rates in the 
 
22 Id. at 237. 
23 Id. at 231–32. 
24 Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, The Effects of Focused Deterrence 
Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 49 
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 323, 327 (2012). 
25 In 2010, there were approximately 159,000 arrests for weapons violations. See Crime 
in the United States, FBI.GOV, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl29.xls (last visited June 30, 2016). 
26 See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Why Do Criminals 
Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 432–35 (2012) (finding that offenders are more likely 
to comply with the law when they perceive police are legitimate government actors). 
27 At the time PSN began, the Chicago Police Department operated twenty-five police 
districts that covered the entire city. These districts were subdivided into roughly 280 “beats” 
of approximately one square mile. Districts were selected as the unit of intervention by the 
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city since the early 1980s. When the program began in 2002, there were 
75.5 homicides and 13.8 gang homicides per 100,000 residents in these 
districts—over three times the citywide average. 28  The 11th and 15th 
districts are located on the west side of the city (see Figure 1), and include 
North Lawndale, West Garfield Park, and Austin. They are predominately 
African American (97%) and have high levels of poverty, high school 
dropout, unemployment, and gang membership.29 
Importantly, PSN has never operated in a vacuum. A number of other 
programs have emerged over the last 15 years, including Cure Violence 
(formerly CeaseFire).30 Many PSN partners—such as the Chicago Police 
Department, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, Cook County 
Probation, and the Illinois Department of Corrections—have implemented 
various other anti-violence programs.31 And non-profit groups, community 
organizations, and churches have organized smaller programs that less 
frequently garner media attention. We lack systematic data on these other 
programs, but to our knowledge, none were implementing anything like 
PSN’s offender notification hearings. 
  
 
PSN taskforce as they represented the most convenient administrative unit. Most local 
policing decisions and resources, for instance, are managed by a district commander. CHI. 
POLICE DEP’T, supra note 20, at 22. 
28 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 242–43. 
29 For a thorough description of the development of this area and its relationship to larger 
social and historical patterns in Chicago, see ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND 
GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940–1960 (1983). 
30 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, SUSAN M. HARTNETT, NATALIE BUMP & JILL DUBOIS, 
EVALUATION OF CEASEFIRE-CHICAGO, at 1-7 to 1-11 (2008) (describing the CeaseFire model 
in Chicago, which included a number of programmatic elements including public health and 
educational outreach, anti-violence street intervention, clergy involvement, and community 
mobilization). 
31 See, e.g., CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CNTY., Adult Probation Programs, 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/Probation
Departments/ProbationforAdults/AdultProbationDepartment/Programs.aspx (follow “Gang 
Intervention Unit”) (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (describing the probation department’s gang 
intervention unit, which was established in 1991). 
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Figure 1  
PSN Treatment Areas & Total Number Homicides in 2002 
B. INITIAL EVALUATION: DESIGN AND RESULTS 
The initial evaluation by Papachristos et al. examined the effects of 
PSN from January 2002 to December 2004 in the 11th and 15th police 
districts.32 The authors addressed the non-random selection of the target 
areas in two ways. First, they used the 7th and 9th districts as comparison 
areas because they had some of the highest homicide rates in the city and 
they were not geographically adjacent to the 11th and 15th.33 Second, they 
applied propensity score models to control for known neighborhood-level 
measures theoretically linked with violence.34 
The investigation represented a significant advancement over previous 
evaluations of focused deterrence anti-violence programs in two ways. 
 
32 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 245, 255. 
33 Id. at 241–42 (illustrating and discussing the concentration of gun violence in the 
study districts). 
34 Id. at 253–54. 
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First, prior evaluations of Boston Ceasefire and Project Exile examined 
city-level crime rates even though the interventions targeted narrow 
geographic areas and populations.35 In contrast, the design employed by 
Papachristos et al. reduced bias by analyzing smaller geographic units that 
were directly targeted by PSN. Second, whereas prior studies identified 
programmatic effects based on changes in crime before and after program 
implementation, the initial evaluation measured the dosage of program 
elements to identify which elements were associated with changes in 
crime.36 
The initial investigation of the first three years of the program found 
that several PSN initiatives were associated with statistically significant 
declines in homicide. Overall, the PSN target communities experienced a 
37% drop in homicide.37 Small to moderate reductions in homicide were 
associated with the number of federal prosecutions and recovered guns. The 
largest reductions were associated with the proportion of eligible offenders 
who attended an offender notification forum.38 A follow-up study reports 
that eligible offenders who attended a forum spent less time in prison than 
those that did not.39 
C. PROGRAM EXPANSION AND OTHER CHANGES IN CHICAGO 
Even before the publication of the initial evaluation, PSN expanded 
quickly throughout the city of Chicago. Both the prosecutorial case review 
and the gun team went citywide by the end of 2004 (though PSN districts 
continued to receive priority status for the former). The forums expanded 
more slowly. In 2005, the PSN taskforce selected the 7th and 9th districts as 
the next PSN target areas (see Figure 1). These districts cover largely 
African American neighborhoods with high levels of poverty, high school 
dropout, unemployment, and violence. In 2006, the program expanded 
again to the 10th and 4th districts. Thus by 2009, a program that began as a 
 
35 Problem-Oriented Policing, supra note 8, at 203–18; Anne Morrison Piehl et al., 
Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 
551–53 (2003); Raphael & Ludwig, supra note 8, at 256–77; Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did 
Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 419, 428–
31 (2005). 
36 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 247–49. 
37 Id. at 254. 
38 Id. at 256–58. 
39 Andrew V. Papachristos, Danielle M. Wallace, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, 
Desistance and Legitimacy: The Impact of Offender Notification Meetings on Recidivism 
Among High Risk Offenders 18 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-343, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2240232. 
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targeted effort in just 8% of the city’s police districts spread to 24%. Today, 
PSN includes nearly all of the city’s high-crime police districts. 
Unfortunately, the expansion of the program was not accompanied by 
an increase in funding or personnel.40 Finite resources were spread across a 
larger area of the city and program efficacy may have suffered as a result. 
For example, at the program’s inception two forums were held each month 
in the two original PSN districts. By 2006, the two bimonthly forums were 
split across six districts on a rotating basis. As a result, the aggressive 
expansion may have overstretched the program’s resources. 
In the later years of the program, PSN faced a number of other 
common challenges in maintaining the “network of capacity” essential to its 
early success.41 First, focused-deterrence programs often rely on a complex 
web of agencies and organizations for key services and support. 42  As 
priorities shift and budgets change, these large coalitions sometimes drift 
apart. As just one example, the Ceasefire program in Boston became less 
effective over time because an organization of African American clergymen 
withdrew from the initiative. 43  Without the clergy, the program lacked 
sufficient community support and capacity to engage in critical street-level 
services.44 While less extreme, PSN faced similar challenges in Chicago as 
dozens of community groups participated in varying ways throughout the 
first decade of the program. Several grassroots organizations that originally 
participated in the forums ceased to operate. A small group composed of 
fathers of homicide victims, for example, ceased to exist because of 
members’ other commitments. Small health care providers and drug 
outreach organizations also came and went as their staffing and funding 
demands fluctuated. To address these service gaps, PSN quickly sought out 
new partner organizations.  
 
40 Resources here refer not just to money, but also manpower. The PSN team remained a 
small and dedicated group of individuals. The PSN forums occurred after normal working 
hours, and PSN team and community members participated in such meetings without 
compensation. 
41 Mark H. Moore, Creating Networks of Capacity: The Challenge of Managing 
Society’s Response to Youth Violence, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW 
APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 338, 372 (Gary S. Katzmann ed., 
2002). 
42 Id. at 372–75. 
43 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches, and the 
Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 141, 156, 160–62 (2008) 
[hereinafter Losing Faith?] (describing the effect of the withdrawal of a group of clergymen 
from the Ceasefire program). 
44 Id. 
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Second, mounting an effective anti-violence program requires 
tremendous organizational skill and personal investment. Turnover in 
personnel can thus create significant challenges.45 Prior team members may 
be replaced by individuals with fewer skills or a weaker commitment to the 
program’s strategy. Boston’s Operation Ceasefire once again provides a 
useful example as it ended soon after the “operational steward” of the 
program, a lieutenant in the police department, was transferred to a different 
unit.46 
The PSN team experienced significant personnel turnover. Since it 
began in 2002, there have been two U.S. Attorneys in the Northern District 
of Illinois, five different Assistant U.S. Attorneys leading daily PSN 
operations, four police superintendents, ten police commanders, two Cook 
County State’s Attorneys, two mayors, and three different fiscal agents 
monitoring grant activities.47 At times, prior team members were replaced 
by new personnel with weaker commitments to the program’s core 
principles and strategy. To help address these problems, the PSN 
coordinators and core support team had to conduct several “reboot” 
trainings to promote buy-in among new personnel and ensure continued 
fidelity in the offender notification forums. Thus, despite turnover, PSN 
remained faithful to most of its core programmatic elements, especially 
prosecutorial review and the forums.  
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
The present study has two main objectives. First, it examines data on 
the effect of PSN in the original PSN districts that span a period of roughly 
eight years. Second, it tests whether PSN expansion districts experienced 
effects similar to the initial districts. 
The non-random selection of the original PSN sites in Chicago poses 
serious challenges for causal inference. The non-random expansion of the 
program further exacerbates the problem. It is, therefore, impossible to test 
the effect of PSN with a randomized experiment. Instead, we use propensity 
score matching to select a set of comparison neighborhoods that are similar 
in historical rates of homicide and in theoretical measures associated with 
 
45 Moore, supra note 41, at 372, 376–77. 
46 Losing Faith?, supra note 43, at 156. 
47 See, e.g., Meet Anita, ANITAALVAREZ.COM, http://www.anitaalvarez.com/meet-anita/ 
(last visited June 30, 2016) (noting that Anita Alvarez was elected as the Cook County 
State’s Attorney in 2008); About the Mayor, CITYOFCHICAGO.ORG, http://www.cityofchicago.
org/city/en/depts/mayor/supp_info/about_the_mayor.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) 
(noting that Rahm Emanuel was elected Mayor of Chicago in 2011). 
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violence. We then fit fixed effects and growth curve models on beat-level 
data from 1999 to 2010 to estimate the relationship between measures of 
PSN dosage and homicide. We begin by describing our strategy for 
selecting comparison beats and then discuss our models. 
A. CHOOSING COMPARISON BEATS 
Our unit of analysis is the police beat, the smallest geographic unit 
used by the Chicago Police Department for which data are consistently 
available over time. For convenience, we refer to (1) police beats that 
received PSN as the treatment group, (2) beats that did not receive PSN as 
the control group, and (3) beats in the control group that are selected as 
comparison beats for our analysis as the matched control group. 
To estimate propensity scores for all beats in the city, we fit a logistic 
regression model on a dummy variable indicating whether each beat is in a 
PSN area (1 = yes, 0 = no). Given the manner in which the program 
expanded, we estimate the logistic regression twice: first, with a dependent 
variable indicating whether a beat is in the original PSN target areas (the 
11th and 15th districts) and then again with a dependent variable indicating 
whether a beat was in one of the expansion areas (the 7th and 9th districts). 
These two logistic models estimate the propensity score for each beat at the 
two selection stages. 
The logistic regression models contain six independent variables. The 
first three variables are neighborhood-level characteristics that are known 
correlates of violent crime: socio-economic deprivation, concentrated 
immigration, and residential stability. 48  These measures were derived 
through principal components analysis from twelve census variables.49 Two 
further variables indicate the number of homicides in each beat in the two 
years prior to PSN implementation. The final variable is the size of the 
residential population. 
Next, we use the propensity scores from the logistic regression to 
select non-PSN beats that are similar to PSN beats. In order to increase 
balance on relevant covariates, we specify the matching algorithm to favor 
matched pairs that are not only similar on propensity scores but also on the 
covariates with which we fit the logistic regression models.50 Importantly, 
 
48 See Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing 
Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 780–81 (1989) (discussing the 
theoretical significance of these neighborhood-level characteristics). 
49 For a more detailed description, see Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 246. 
50 See PAUL R.  ROSENBAUM, DESIGN OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 168–72 (2010). 
3. GRUNWALD 4/6/2017  6:45 PM 
144 GRUNWALD & PAPACHRISTOS  [Vol. 107 
all police beats that have been selected as PSN target areas were dropped 
before matching to ensure they were not selected as matched controls.51 A 
matched control group was selected for each of the two stages of site 
selection. In the first stage, twenty-four matched control beats were selected 
for each of the twenty-four treatment beats in the 11th and 15th districts; in 
the second stage, thirty matched control beats were selected for each of the 
thirty treatment beats in the 7th and 9th districts. We considered selecting a 
larger number of matched control beats to increase statistical power, but 
found an insufficient number of similar beats to do so. 
A comparison of pre-treatment covariates in the 11th and 15th districts 
reveals that propensity score matching has dramatically increased the 
comparability of the treatment and control group.52 Though the shapes of 
some of the distributions differ in the treatment and matched control 
group,53 the means of the distributions are all similar. Most importantly, the 
distributions of the propensity score in the treatment and matched control 
group are similar. Moreover, on average, there were 4 and 4.2 homicides in 
2000 in the treatment and matched control group respectively. In the next 
year, there were 4.6 and 4.4 respectively. Beats in both treatment and 
matched control groups had an average population size just over 6,300. A 
comparison of pre-treatment covariates reveals a similar pattern of results 
for the 7th and 9th districts (see Appendix Figure 2). The distributions of 
the propensity scores in the treatment and matched control group are 
relatively similar. The average number of homicides per beat in 2003 was 
approximately 3.1 in the treatment group and 2.3 in the matched control 
group. In 2004, the average number of homicides was 2.3 in the treatment 
group and 2 in the matched control group. Treatment beats had an average 
of 8,700 residents, while matched control beats had a higher average of 
9,700 residents. 
To assess balance between the treatment and matched control groups 
more systematically, we applied the t-test and Wilcoxon ranked sum test to 
each of the variables.54 The only statistically significant difference at the .05 
level was in the immigrant concentration variable for the first site selection. 
 
51 Thus, the 11th and 15th were dropped because they were the first PSN areas. The 7th 
and 9th were also dropped because PSN expanded there in 2005. And, finally, the 4th and 
10th were also dropped because PSN expanded there later. 
52 See infra Appendix Figure 1. 
53 Some distributional differences are to be expected due to the relatively small number 
of beats in the treatment and matched control groups. 
54 Unlike the t-test, the Wilcoxon ranked sum test does not assume normality. See MYLES 
HOLLANDER & DOUGLAS A. WOLFE, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL METHODS 36–37 (2d ed. 
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Ideally, the treatment and matched control group would be equivalent 
on all variables that affect the homicide rate. In practice, this goal was 
difficult to achieve. First, we may not have all relevant variables that affect 
homicide. Second, the program has expanded to cover roughly 20% of all 
beats in the city, capturing most neighborhoods with high levels of violence 
and predominately African American populations. PSN thus already 
encompasses most of the neighborhoods in the city that could serve as 
viable comparisons. As noted, the initial evaluation of PSN used the 7th and 
9th districts as comparison groups for the 11th and 15th PSN areas, but the 
program has since expanded to the 7th and 9th districts. 
Ultimately, the similarity between the treatment and matched control 
groups is not ideal relative to other non-policing studies in the evaluation 
literature. However, the use of propensity score matching in the evaluation 
of criminal justice programs like PSN presents unique challenges because 
of the nature of gun violence, which can never be truly randomized, and the 
politics and practical implementations of such programs. The use of 
propensity score matching in criminal justice research is still in its infancy 
and our matching procedures do appear to substantially improve the control 
group. Under these circumstances, it may be more desirable to fit the model 
with all observations and control for observable covariates rather than to fit 
the model on a matched control group selected on the basis of the 
observable covariates. We refit our fixed effect model with all beats in the 
city (excluding beats in other PSN target districts) and added a variable 
indicating the propensity score for each beat. The results were substantively 
similar. 
B. ANALYTIC MODELS 
We fit two different models to estimate the effect of PSN dosage on 
homicide in Chicago. First, we fit a fixed effect model with a fixed intercept 
and slope for time for each beat. Including slopes for time for each beat can 
lead to large standard errors, but the results are substantively similar when 
the slopes are removed from the models. Second, we fit a growth curve 
model with a random intercept and slope for time for each beat.55  
 
1999). The value of both tests is limited given the small sample sizes. 
55 Our growth curve model was a two-level model predicting within-beat trajectories at 
level 1 and between-beat trajectories at level 2 using the predicted level 1 intercepts and 
slopes as outcomes. We estimate the following model: 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ܠ࢏࢐ߚ ൅ ߞ଴௝ ൅ ߞଵ௝ݐ௜௝ ൅	߳௜௝ 
where ܠ௜௝  represents a matrix of constant and time varying covariates, ߞ଴௝  represents a 
random intercept for beats, and ߞଵ௝ represents a random slope for time. 
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We fit these models on a panel data set for all beats in the 11th and 
15th districts and their matched controls, where each beat has a row for 
each year-quarter from 1999 to 2010. We then refit the models on a similar 
dataset for the 7th and 9th districts and their matched controls. The results 
of both the fixed effect and growth curve models are substantively similar. 
We, therefore, present the results of the fixed effect models, which are more 
resistant to unobserved bias. 
We model two dependent variables: total homicide and gun homicide. 
Both variables are logged. 56  Our models include six main independent 
variables. First, we include a variable indicating whether a beat is a PSN 
treatment beat (1 = yes, 0 = no). Second, we include a time-varying dummy 
variable indicating whether PSN was in operation during a particular year-
quarter (1 = yes, 0 = no). For the 11th and 15th districts, we set the PSN 
start date as January 2002, and for the 7th and 9th, the start date is January 
2005. Third, we include a count variable representing the number of ATF 
gun traces in each beat in each period; this variable acts as a proxy for gun 
seizures. Fourth, we include the log of the number of PSN prosecutions in 
each beat in each period. Fifth and related to the fourth variable, we also 
consider a measure of the log of the average PSN sentence in each beat in 
each period. Finally, we include a variable that measures the log of the 
estimated number of residents that attended a PSN offender notification 
forum in each beat in each period.57 
All of the data used in this study were provided by the agencies 
participating in PSN, including the Chicago Police Department, the United 
States Attorney’s Office of the Northern District of Illinois, and the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Changes in personnel and 
data collection procedures over time present special challenges in both 
replicating the original variables used by the initial evaluation and in 
creating consistent measures for the entire study period. This problem was 
particularly acute for the measure of the number of attendees at PSN 
offender notification forums.58 We faced two problems in particular. First, 
we were unable to locate attendee data from 2007 and 2008. We imputed 
forum data in each beat for this period with a best-fit line and added random 
 
56 Because some values for the dependent variable were zero, we added an offset of 
0.0001 to the dependent variable before transforming to the log scale. 
57 As with the dependent variables, we added an offset of 0.0001 to all logged measures 
because some values were equal to zero. 
58 Unlike Papachristos et al., supra note 4, we measure forum dosage by the absolute 
number of participants rather than the proportion of eligible attendants to promote easier 
interpretation of the results.  
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error using the mean of the absolute value of the residuals from the model. 
We present models that include the imputed data for 2007 and 2008, but the 
results for the forum variable were substantively similar when these years 
were excluded. Second, data from 2003 to 2006 were only available at the 
zipcode-level. We therefore imputed the number of forum participants from 
zipcode to beat through areal interpolation. For 2009 and 2010, we 
measured forum attendance by summing the number of forum attendees in 
each beat at each year-quarter. Precise address-level data for this period 
were available on a significant fraction of all forum attendees from the 11th 
and 15th (54%) and 7th and 9th districts (66%).59 
Figure 2 depicts the total number of forum attendees per year-quarter 
in the two PSN treatment areas. Roughly twenty-five to thirty participants 
attended the forums in the 11th and 15th districts per quarter in 2003. 
Importantly, Figure 2 also shows that the number of forum attendees in the 
11th and 15th districts decreased gradually over time, especially as the 
program expanded to the 7th and 9th districts. The number of forum 
participants in the 7th and 9th districts increased over time, peaking at 
roughly twenty-five to thirty participants per quarter in 2009 and 2010. 
  
 
59 Because we are missing a non-trivial fraction of attendees for 2009 and 2010, we also 
created a second measure of forum attendance for these years. Data on the total number of 
all forum attendees in each year-quarter were available at the district-couplet level, that is, 
the combined number of forum participants in the 11th and 15th districts, and the 7th and 9th 
districts in each year-quarter from 2009 to 2010. Data was also available on the number of 
parolees eligible for a PSN forum during each year-quarter at the zipcode-level. We imputed 
the zipcode-level eligibility data to the beat-level using areal interpolation. Then, assuming 
that PSN forum participants were distributed proportionately to the number of eligible 
participants in each beat in each year-quarter, we imputed the total number of participants in 
each district couplet at each year-quarter to the beat-level. The results for both measures 
produced broadly similar results. We present models based on the first measure, which we 
believe is subject to substantially less error. 
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Figure 2  
Estimated Aggregate Number of Forum Participants in the 
11th & 15th Districts and the 7th & 9th Districts60 
III. RESULTS 
Figures 3 and 4 display the average homicide rate per beat in each 
year-quarter for the PSN treatment areas. The vertical dotted line indicates 
the start date of the program in each area. The black line represents the 
average number of homicides per beat in the treatment group, and the gray 
line represents the average number of homicides per beat in the matched-
comparison group. Overall, Figure 3 shows that homicide has decreased by 
approximately 10% since the start of PSN in the 11th and 15th districts. The 
steepest decline in both the treatment and matched control groups continues 
until 2006. Since that year, both areas’ homicide rates have risen slightly, 
but they remain lower than the pre-PSN levels. Figure 4 shows that 
homicide rates in the 7th and 9th districts are more stable but also 
experienced a steady decline reaching a low point in 2006. In both areas, 
homicide rates reached their respective lowest points around that year and 
have risen slightly since. In the following models, we attempt to estimate 
whether any beat-level declines in homicide can be attributed to the dosage 
of PSN activities.  
 
60 As noted, data on the number of forum recipients for 2007 and 2008 is not available. 
The data presented for those years is imputed. 
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Figure 3 
Average Homicide Per Beat in 11th and 15th Districts and 
Matched Control Group 
Figure 4 
Average Homicide Per Beat in 7th and 9th Districts 
and Matched Control Group 
The results from our analyses provide insights into both the sustained 
effects within the original PSN districts and the effects in the expansion 
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districts. Tables 1 and 2 present the coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) from our regression models for the original and expansion 
PSN districts.61 
Table 1 displays the results of the fixed effect model for the 11th and 
15th police districts using data from 1999 to 2010. Several key findings 
emerge. First, the PSN Operating coefficient is negative in both the total 
homicide and gun homicide models, showing a substantial and statistically 
significant decrease in homicides when PSN is in operation. 
 
Table 1 
Fixed Effect Models on Logged Total and Gun Homicide, 
11th & 15th Districts 
 
Second, the coefficients for both of the prosecutorial variables are 
statistically significant. The logged number of prosecutions is negative and 
statistically significant for both overall homicides and gun homicides. The 
coefficient is -0.249 for total homicides and -.221 for gun homicides, which 
means that a 1% increase in PSN prosecutions is associated with a .25% 
decrease in total homicides per beat and a 0.24% decrease in gun homicides 
per beat. The sentence length parameter is positive and statistically 
significant in both the total and gun homicide models, indicating that higher 
sentence lengths are associated with more homicides; in this case, the 
 
61 We present cluster-robust standard errors clustered by beat. 
B p-value B p-value
PSN Operating -1.41 0.002 -1.06 0.014
(.460) (.433)
Trace 0.047 0.027 0.044 0.031
(.021) (.020)
log(Prosecution) -0.249 0.001 -0.221 0.006
(.076) (.080)
log(Sentence) 0.237 0.000 0.236 0.000
(.066) (.066)
log(Forum) -0.093 0.006 -0.103 0.001
(.034) (.032)
Year-Quarter -0.04 0.009 -0.066 0.000
(.015) (.014)
Fixed Intercepts for 48 Beats Yes Yes
Fixed Slopes for 48 Beats Yes Yes
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level
Total Homicide Gun Homicide
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positive association could reflect the association between higher sentences 
in federal prosecution and the overall more serious nature of crimes 
diverted to federal court (i.e., very few low-level, nonviolent crimes make 
their way to federal court). It is important to note once again that the total 
number of federal PSN prosecutions is low relative to the overall number of 
gun cases in the city. Furthermore, the average number of cases taken to 
federal court has declined over the life of the PSN program. In 2005, the 
State of Illinois developed its own “armed habitual criminal” statute that 
enhanced penalties for gun offenders in state court.62 As a result, cases that 
might have previously been selected for federal prosecution may have 
remained in the state system. 
Third, the parameter estimates for the number of guns traced is 
positive and statistically significant, which suggests that as the number of 
guns recovered in a beat increases, the number of homicides also increases. 
Surprisingly, this finding runs contrary to that of Papachristos et al., who 
found a negative association between gun traces and homicides. 63  This 
directional reversal may arise from changes in the practice of firearms 
tracing and gun policing more generally in Chicago. When PSN began in 
2002, Chicago’s comprehensive tracing program had fallen behind in trace 
requests; some members of the PSN team also believed that gun seizures 
had diminished as a policing priority. Getting tracing back on track and 
making gun seizures a priority became a central goal of PSN, especially 
within the treatment areas. The formation of the PSN gun teams was viewed 
as an important step in renewing these commitments to gun policing efforts.  
Figure 5 plots the annual number of firearms traced and the homicide rate 
(times 10) during the observation period. The shaded area displays the 
initial PSN evaluation period. While it is impossible to place causal weight 
on this explanation, Figure 5 provides suggestive evidence that the original 
finding by Papachristos et al. captured a unique point in time when gun 
seizures and traces were at a low point. With the exception of the early 
years of PSN, Figure 5 shows that the trends between gun traces and 
homicides are roughly parallel: more guns are recovered in years with more 
homicides. Whether or not this change in seizures and subsequent tracing 
can be attributed to PSN is not something we can answer with our data. But 
the timing of these changes shows that PSN started at an important time for 
gun policing and gun tracing efforts in Chicago. 
  
 
62 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/ § 24–1.7 (2005). 
63 Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 258. 
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Figure 5 
Annual Number of Gun Traces and Homicides (times 10) in Chicago, 
2000 to 2010 
Finally, our model in Table 1 provides evidence of an effect for the 
number of forum attendees. The coefficient is -.093 for the total homicide 
model and -0.103 for the gun homicide model. This means that a 1% 
increase in the number of PSN forum attendees is associated with a 0.1% 
decrease in homicide and a 0.11% decrease in gun homicide. The results are 
generally consistent with the prior evaluation, which also found that the 
forums were associated with a statistically significant reduction in total and 
gun homicides in the 11th and 15th police districts.64  
Results from the 11th and 15th districts are sensitive to several 
alternative model specifications. First, excluding data on the first three 
years of the program (2002–2004) leads to dramatically smaller coefficients 
for the forum variable that are not statistically significant (not shown), 
suggesting that some of the results in Table 1 are driven by the initial period 
of the program. Second, in our main model we set the start of PSN in the 
11th and 15th districts as January of 2002, but not all of the PSN programs 
started at that time. The first offender notification forum did not take place 
until the next year. Setting the start date for PSN in the 11th and 15th 
districts as January of 2003 cuts the coefficient for the forum variable in 
 
64 Id. at 256–57. 
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half and renders it statistically insignificant. We believe that 2002 is the 
more appropriate start date as other aspects of PSN—including the gun 
teams, prosecutorial efforts, and media outreach—were all underway; 
nonetheless, sensitivity in the results warrant caution in interpreting our 
models. 
Table 2 presents our models for the expansion of PSN to the 7th and 
9th districts. Consistent with the models for the 11th and 15th, the number 
of ATF gun traces is positively correlated with homicide. In contrast to the 
11th and 15th districts, however, the models detect no statistically 
significant association for either the number of forum participants or PSN 
prosecutions. The parameters are directionally consistent but much smaller 
and not statistically significant.65 
A number of matched control beats in our primary analysis are directly 
adjacent to a PSN district (e.g., 7th, 9th, 11th, or 15th) or are located in 
districts that are adjacent to a PSN district. This raises the possibility of 
program-effect “spill over.” To accommodate for this problem, we 
estimated two alternative model specifications. One set of models selected 
comparison beats excluding all districts that are adjacent to any PSN 
districts. Unsurprisingly, this selection procedure left an insufficient 
number of comparable non-PSN beats to achieve adequate balance on pre-
treatment covariates. In a second set of models, we selected comparison 
beats by excluding all beats that are directly adjacent to PSN districts. This 
matching strategy produced a matched comparison group with less balance 
on pre-treatment covariates than the primary matched comparison group, 
but the difference is not dramatic. The results of the analysis for this 
alternative matched control group were substantively similar to our primary 
results. 
  
 
65 Notably, additional models not shown here using the second measure of forum 
participation estimate directionally consistent coefficients that were close to being 
statistically significant at the .05 level. We place greater trust in the measure of forum 
recipients presented in Table 2, which, while also subject to some error, provides a more 
accurate beat-level measure of forum participants in the later years of the analysis. 
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Table 2 
Fixed Effects Models on Logged Total and Gun Homicide,  
7th & 9th Districts 
IV. DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS 
The initial evaluation of PSN Chicago found that the dosage of several 
program components was negatively correlated with total homicide and gun 
homicide in the initial target areas.66 The authors found a particularly strong 
negative correlation between homicide and offender notification forums. 
Years later, PSN continues to operate in the original target communities and 
has also expanded to other high-crime areas of the city. 
The current study sought to answer two questions. First, do the original 
PSN target communities continue to experience positive programmatic 
effects years later? Second, have subsequent PSN target districts 
experienced programmatic effects that are comparable to those in the initial 
target districts? With respect to the first question, we find a continued—
albeit smaller—negative correlation between the outcome variables and the 
number of forum participants and PSN prosecutions. A decade after PSN 
began we can still detect programmatic effects in the original treatment 
 
66 See Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 254–59. 
B p-value B p-value
PSN Operating -0.046 0.907 -0.286 0.463
(.397) (.389)
Trace 0.035 0.027 0.041 0.004
(.016) (.015)
log(Prosecution) -0.109 0.147 -0.109 0.112
(.075) (.068)
log(Sentence) 0.084 0.207 0.094 0.100
(.066) (.055)
log(Forum) -0.027 0.533 -0.040 0.352
(.043) (.042)
Year-Quarter -0.080 0.000 -0.085 0.000
(.015) (.015)
Fixed Intercepts for 48 Beats Yes Yes
Fixed Slopes for 48 Beats Yes Yes
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level
Total Homicide Gun Homicide
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communities, at least in the first three years of the program’s operation. Our 
models detected little evidence, however, of programmatic effects 
associated with the expansion to the 7th and 9th police districts. 
Given the longevity of PSN Chicago and the differences between the 
results of the current analysis and that of the initial evaluation, it is worth 
considering why the results vary by time and police district. 
We believe two theoretical considerations provide the most plausible 
answers. First, the effects of large-scale social interventions can dissipate 
over time. It is possible, for example, that focused deterrence strategies like 
PSN exert a short-term shock on homicide rates that dissipates over time as 
residents become accustomed to the new and more punitive criminal justice 
“regime.” Although some studies have examined the effect of focused-
deterrence strategies over several years, there is little empirical evidence in 
the literature on the effects of such strategies over the long term.67 
Second, changes in the implementation and activities of the program 
may also explain why we observe smaller correlations between program 
elements and homicide rates in the later years. Perhaps most importantly, 
the expansion of PSN to other areas of the city may have diluted the 
treatment dosage in the original PSN districts. By 2009, PSN expanded to 
24% of all police districts without any increase in program resources. 
Program dilution may also help explain why we observe little evidence of a 
reduction in violence in the expansion districts.68 Indeed, the 7th and 9th 
districts are considerably larger in terms of both geography and 
population.69 These areas may have never achieved the kind of “saturation” 
 
67 One study examined the effect of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence over a 
3.5-year period. See Engel et al., supra note 15. Two others have examined Boston’s 
Operation Ceasefire program, first over a two-year period in the 1990s, and then again over a 
four-year period in the 2000s when it started back up again in response to a resurgence in 
juvenile crime. See Problem-Oriented Policing, supra note 8; Anthony A. Braga, David M. 
Hureau & Andrew V. Papachristos, Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence: Measuring the 
Impact of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 30 J. QUANT. 
CRIMINOLOGY 113 (2014). 
68 See, e.g., Losing Faith?, supra note 43, at 156–57 (2008) (arguing that the ability of 
the City of Boston to combat youth violence decreased over time as its anti-violence 
strategies were expanded “to a broader range of problems such as investigating unsolved 
shootings, the re-entry of incarcerated violent offenders back into high-risk Boston 
neighborhoods, and criminogenic families in hot spot areas”). 
69 See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (2006), https://portal. chicago
police.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Annual%20Reports/06
ARRev_2.pdf (stating that the total population in the 11th and 15th districts is 155,128, and 
in the 7th and 9th is almost 260,000); see supra Figure 1 (showing that the 7th and 9th 
districts are larger geographically than the 11th and 15th). 
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that took place in the original PSN areas. If dilution is responsible for the 
diminished effects in the expansion areas, then policymakers should 
hesitate to expand effective PSN programs to new geographic areas unless 
commensurate resources are available. Future research may test these two 
theoretical explanations by examining long-term focused-deterrence 
interventions that invest a stable level of resources in the original target area 
throughout the study period. 
Several methodological considerations may also help explain the 
divergent results in the current paper and the initial evaluation by 
Papachristos et al. First, they used the 7th and 9th districts as comparison 
areas for the 11th and 15th districts because of similarities in homicide rates 
and socio-ecological neighborhood features. Since PSN later expanded to 
these areas of the city, we are unable to use them as comparison beats. To 
overcome the small number of plausible comparison neighborhoods left 
untreated by PSN, we used propensity score matching to select matched 
control beats from across the city. Second, our measure of PSN forums 
differs somewhat from the measure used in the earlier evaluation. 
Papachristos et al. measured the treatment dosage as a proportion of eligible 
parolees who attended a PSN forum while we measure the total number of 
forum participants. More importantly, our measures of PSN attendance in 
the later years of the study are subject to greater error due to changes in 
data-collection practice over time.70 For two years, we have no forum data 
at all. This higher level of error likely attenuated the magnitude of our 
estimates.71 
Before concluding, we offer several additional words of caution in 
interpreting the results of our models. First, as noted earlier, we observed 
imperfect balance on pre-treatment covariates and propensity scores 
between the treatment and matched control groups. The treatment and 
matched control groups may also differ on other relevant variables that we 
were unable to observe. For example, research on “neighborhood effects” 
consistently shows the importance of various social processes and structures 
that are related to neighborhood-level crime rates, which we are unable to 
 
70 Specifically, our first measure of the forums is missing a significant fraction of all 
participants. Our second measure involves imputation, both from the zipcode-level to the 
beat-level, and from the district-level to the beat-level. Both measures produced results that 
are similar in direction and magnitude, reinforcing confidence in our results. 
71 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL 
DATA 81 (2d ed. 2010). 
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capture in our data.72 These considerations further limit the strength of our 
causal inferences. 
Second, some of the matched control beats in our analysis are either 
directly adjacent to a PSN district or are located in districts that are adjacent 
to a PSN district, which raises the possibility of program-effect “spill over.” 
To address this problem, we fit an alternative model specification that 
excluded all beats directly adjacent to PSN districts. Although this matching 
strategy produced a matched comparison group with less balance on pre-
treatment covariates than the primary matched comparison group, the 
results of our models were substantively similar. 
Chicago’s PSN program is one of the longest running and most 
rigorously studied violence prevention programs. The initial evaluation 
found statistically significant negative correlations between homicide and 
the dosage of PSN initiatives in the first few years of their operation. The 
current study finds similar results for that period, but little evidence of an 
effect in subsequent years. Something seems to have happened in those 
early years that is associated with reductions in violence in high-crime 
communities. We cannot be sure why the dramatic short-term effects did 
not sustain over time or extend to other areas of the city. But future research 
would do well to consider the strategies that were effective in the early 
years and leverage those insights for future programs. 
 
72 See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 48, at 780–82. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Figure 1 
Comparison of Pre-Treatment Covariates for the 
11th and 15th Districts 
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Appendix Figure 2 
Comparison of Pre-Treatment Covariates for the  
7th and 9th Districts 
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